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cited by the Court in a footnote, it was held that the ICC had the power to
compel divestiture even though such was not expressly granted by the Inter-
state Commerce Act. "The justification for the remedy is the removal of the
violation."24
Consequently, the acts charged as antitrust violations are within the
jurisdiction of the CAB and that agency can grant a complete remedy.
Therefore, in accordance with the primary jurisdiction principle formulated
above, the CAB has sole jurisdiction over the matter and the antitrust laws
are to that extent superseded. The Court thus has followed the proper
course of action in dismissing the antitrust suit.
It is a well known canon of construction that repeals by implication are
not favored. Yet, when the circumstances are similar to those presented in
Pan American, the courts should be willing to find that all but review juris-
diction has been ceded to the regulatory body. The two regimes of law
would surely collide if after the CAB found that the practices of the parties
were in the public interest, the courts could find that they were violations of
the antitrust laws. Uniformity of regulation would thereby have suffered
greatly. We have not yet reached the point where all actions involving reg-
ulated industries must be brought before a regulatory agency, 25 although
some may view Pan American as a step in that direction. Illustrative is the
statement of the attorneys for the reclusive Mr. Howard Hughes that "the
CAB, rather than the courts, should settle disputes involving control of air-
lines."2° Finally, although the Court attempted to limit its decision to the
"narrow questions" presented in the case, it may have cast doubt upon the
applicability of the antitrust laws to any situation involving airlines. If that
be so, a more definitive statement of the inter-relationship of the antitrust
laws and the Civil Aeronautics Act will be required in subsequent cases.
CHARLES BRADFORD ABBOTT
Antitrust—Clayton Act—Section 4B—Statute of Limitations—Doc-
trine of Fraudulent Concealment.—Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac.
Elec. Co. 1—in February 1962 the plaintiff brought two treble damage suits
against the defendant electric companies under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act.2 The defendants were alleged to have been implicated in a conspiracy
to fix the prices of certain items of electrical equipment. The plaintiff as-
24
 Id. at 130.
25 It has been suggested that we may be approaching that point. See Schwartz,
supra note 7, at 469-70.
26 Newsweek, February 25, 1963, pp. 79-80.
1 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1962), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. Week 3283 (U.S.
Feb. 28, 1963) (No. 881).
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
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serted that the conspiracy had existed since 1948, but did not claim to have
sustained any injury until 1954, when the defendants overcharged it for
electrical equipment purchased in that year. The conspiracy was first dis-
covered in 1960, when the federal government indicted the defendants for
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 3
 In the district court the de-
fendants made a motion to dismiss, claiming that a treble damage action was
barred by the four year statute of limitations provided by Section 4B of the
Clayton Act.4 The plaintiff contended that the operation of the statute of
limitations was tolled by the defendants' fraudulent concealment of the
cause of action, 5 and that the statute had not begun to run until the cause of
action was discovered in 1960. Defendants' motion was sustained by the
district court. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed. HELD: It was the intent of Congress when passing section 4B that
the doctrine of fraudulent concealment should apply to toll the statute of
limitations until the cause of action was discovered.
The present case is one of more than 1,700 electrical industry price-
fixing cases now before the courts. Many of these involve the question pre-
sented in the principal case, and the outcome of these cases will largely de-
pend on a definitive resolution of the problem. Since these cases for the
first time present the question of tolling the federal statute of limitations as
applied in antitrust cases, pressure is put on the courts to evolve a doctrine
general enough to cover any antitrust conspiracy litigation, yet specific enough
to handle any individual case. At present six cases involving the same issue
have been decided by various district courts, 6 and at least four other cases
have been decided by circuit courts.? In the aggregate the cases have pre-
3 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). Section 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.
4 G9 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1958). Section 413 provides:
Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections 15 or 15a of this title
shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of
action accrued. No cause of action barred under existing law on the effective
date of this section and sections 15a and 16 of this title shall be revived by said
sections.
5 The doctrine of fraudulent concealment was created as an exception to the running
of the statute of limitations. It is to be distinguished from the recognized exception that
where the cause of action is fraud there need be no active concealment of the fraud to
toll the statute, the act of concealment being included in the offense of "fraud." However,
in cases where the original cause of action is not fraud there must be an affirmative act
by the wrongdoer to prevent the injured party from discovering the cause of action, See
generally Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 Mich, L. Rev.
875 (1933).
6 Courts bolding that fraudulent concealment tolls the statute: United States &
T.V.A. V. General Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp, 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Public Serv. Co. v.
Allen-Bradley Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1962 Trade Cas.) 11 70,549 (D. Colo. 1962) ; De-
partment of Water Works v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1963 Trade
Cas.) 70,651 (S.D. Cal. 1963); City of Burlington, Vt. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
Trade Reg. Rep. (1963 Trade Cas.) 4 70,684 (D. D.C. 1963). Courts against tolling
statute: Brigham City Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. .574 (D. Utah 1962);
Public Serv. Co. v. A. B. Chance Co., 210 F. Supp. 1, (D. N.M. 1962).
7 Courts holding that fraudulent concealment tolls the statute: Atlantic City Elec. Co.
v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1962), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. week
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sented numerous and varied arguments, but, as Judge Becker has candidly
stated, ". . . in the present state of authorities, the question could honestly
be decided either way."8
Prior to the enactment of section 4B the federal courts applied state
statutes of limitations° in treble damage antitrust cases. These statutes were
not specifically designed to cope with antitrust litigation, and the decisions
applying them are not in point since the courts are now required to use the
federal statute of limitations embodied in section 4B. A general body of
federal law has been developed, however, which pertains to statute of limita-
tions questions and which has been utilized in antitrust cases. This doctrine
causes the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action to toll the statute.
Bailey v. Glover'° first announced this rule by applying it to the two-year
statute of limitations under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867."
In suits in equity where relief is sought on the ground of fraud, the
authorities are without conflict in support of the doctrine that where
the ignorance of the fraud has been produced by affirmative acts of
the guilty party in concealing the facts from the other, the statute
will not bar relief provided suit is brought within proper time after
the discovery of the fraud. 12
The Court did not limit the rule to suits in equity, stating that it would also
apply on the law side,' 3
 and the doctrine was not restricted to cases where
the original cause of action was fraud. 14
While there is little dispute about the history of the doctrine since the
Bailey case, the present controversy involves a decision as to whether Con-
gress intended, by passage of section 4B, to overrule the application of the
doctrine in conspiracy cases arising under the treble damage provisions of
the Clayton Act. 15 Thus, the present problem, as viewed by the courts, turns
3299 (U.S. March 8, 1963) (No. 912) ; Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1963 Trade Cas.) 11 70,724 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Public Serv. Co. v.
General Elec. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1963 Trade Cas.) A 70,716 (10th Cir. 1963). Court
holding that fraudulent concealment does not toll the statute: Rinzler v. Westinghouse
Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. (1963 Trade Cas.) 11 70,723 (5th Cir. 1963).
8 Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 545, 549 (W.D. Mo.
1962) .
9 Moviecolor, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 821 (1961) ; Norman Tobacco & Candy Co. v. Gillette Safety Corp., 197 F. Supp.
333 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
10 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874).
11 14 Stat. 518 (1867).
12 Supra note 10, at 347.
13
 Id. at 349.
14 See Dawson, supra note 5.
15 The culmination of the application of the doctrine occurred in Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946), the dispute there being based on whether fraudu-
lent concealment tolled the New York statute of limitations as applied to Section 16 of
the Federal Farm Loan Act, 39 Stat. 374 (1916), 12 U.S.C. § 812 (1958). Among other
things, the Supreme Court, by way of dictum, held that the fraudulent concealment
doctrine
.. is read into every federal statute of limitation. If the Federal Farm Loan
Act had an explicit statute of limitation for bringing suit under § 16, the time
would not have begun to run until after petitioners had discovered, or had failed
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upon congressional intent, a factor discussed in every case involving the
construction of section 4B, and usually deemed the most crucial factor. An
analysis of the legislative history of section 4B leads to the conclusion that
excellent arguments could be marshalled for either position, and any holding
based wholly on that history would seem to be tenuous. Early bills intro-
duced in the House Committee on the judiciary 18 included a provision that
the statute of limitations be tolled until the plaintiff discovers "facts upon
which he relies for proof of existence of the conspiracy. . . ."17 (Emphasis
supplied.) The defendants (and several district courts) placed much em-
phasis on these prior bills and claimed that the refusal of Congress to include
such provisions in section 4B was proof that Congress did not intend to in-
clude the fraudulent concealment doctrine. As the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit points out, "discovery" is not necessarily synonymous with
the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The intent of the early bills was not
to toll the statute until discovery of a cause of action that had been fraudu-
lently concealed, but to toll the statute until discovery of sufficient facts,
fraudulently concealed, to prove an already known cause of action. 18 The
explanation given on the floor of the House by Congressman Celler, chairman
of the committee reporting the final bill, indicates that a difference between
"discovery" and "fraudulent concealment" was recognized. In the now
famous colloquy between Congressmen Celler and Patmani. 9 it was specifically
in reasonable diligence to discover, the alleged deception. . . . It would be too
incongruous to confine a federal right within the bare terms of a State statute
of limitation unrelieved by the settled federal equitable doctrine as to fraud when
even a federal statute in the same terms would be given the mitigating construc-
tion required by that doctrine.
16 An example of one of the earliest bills is H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950),
which provides:
Any action ... to enforce any cause of action under this section may be com-
menced within six years after the cause of action accrued or, if the cause of
action is based upon a conspiracy in violation of antitrust laws, after the plain-
tiff discovered (or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discov-
ered) the facts relied upon for proof of the conspiracy; and every such action
shall be forever barred unless commenced within such six-year period.
11 Id.
18 That this was the purpose of the bill is shown by the fact that the person who
sought introduction of this provision was George B. Burnham who had recently received
an adverse judgment in a suit for treble damages under the antitrust laws. Burnham
Chemical Co. v. Borax Consolidated, 170 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
924 (1948). It was shown in that case that Burnham had known of the cause of action
but was unable to get sufficient proof within the period of the statute of limitations and
was therefore barred when he later felt he had sufficient proof. The introduction of the
discovery provision in the bill was an attempt to get legislative authority to bring his
suit again. See generally Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly
Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14, pt. 5
(1950).
10 101 Cong. Rec. 5129, 5130, 5132-33 (1955). At 5132-33 there is the following
exchange:
Mr. Celler:	 We provide that the 4-year statute shall start to run from
the time of the accrual of damages, from the time the wrong was done, not
from the time of discovery.
Mr. Patman: Even in the case of fraud or conspiracy?
Mr. Celler: No. In the case of fraud or conspiracy the statute of limitation
only runs from the time of discovery.
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stated that as to all cases of fraud and conspiracy arising under the private
antitrust provisions the statute of limitations would be tolled; the statute
would not be tolled unless the case involved fraud or conspiracy. The per-
sistent questioning by Patman and the consistent answers of Celler seem to
preclude a finding that Celler's statements were "rash, isolated opinions. . . .
On the contrary, Mr. Celler's remarks are clarifying additions that reflect the
careful diligence of a congressman who virtually lived with the problem
during the course of several congressional sessions." 20
It would seem that the courts have spent too much time "searching for
the will and intent" of Congress, however necessary it may be, and not
enough time working out a reasonable standard for the application of the
statute of limitations to conspiracy cases in the light of the purposes of the
antitrust laws. The approach of the Eighth Circuit indicates that the legisla-
tive history should be viewed in the light of the self-evident proposition that
a wrongdoer should not be free of liability simply because he is able to art-
fully cover up his wrongdoing until the statute of limitations bars the injured
party from seeking relief. The court views the creation of a federal antitrust
statute of limitations as an attempt to achieve a uniform period throughout
the country, its purpose being to eliminate the problems raised by applying
state statutes which vary from one to twenty years. In declaring a uniform
period Congress did not mean to abrogate the exceptions to the statute of limita-
tions which have been established by the federal courts. There is no doubt
that conspiracies in restraint of trade are not in the public interest, and that
allowing private parties to sue for treble damages discourages such con-
spiracies. To overrule the fraudulent concealment doctrine would defeat the
desirable public policy of aiming double-barrelled action at antitrust violators.
In addition to the antitrust considerations, the purpose of the statutes
of limitations must be considered. While they are basically designed to cut
off remedial rights for injuries incurred in the distant past, the statutes are
aimed at inaction, negligence or wrongful conduct on the part of the injured
party. Statutes of limitations
. .. were enacted to prevent frauds; to prevent parties from as-
serting rights after the lapse of time had destroyed or impaired the
evidence which would show that such rights never existed, or had
been satisfied, transferred, or extinguished, if they ever did exist."
Where a statute of limitations is established to prevent fraud on the part of
the injured party, it must not be so construed as to allow fraud on the part
of the wrongdoer. The fraudulent concealment doctrine fills the possible
loophole in the statute of limitations and balances the scales of justice by
preventing a wrongdoer from using the statute to perpetrate fraud.
The legislative history of section 4B is used by those not in favor of
tolling the statute to find that the purposes of antitrust treble damage laws
will only be carried out if the fraudulent concealment doctrine is not applied.
Claims that are allowed to be drawn out for a long period of time tend to
get stale, and a uniform four year statute with the toiling provisions of a
20 Supra note 1, at 280.
21 Bailey v. Glover, supra note 10, at 349.
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fraudulent concealment doctrine could promote this tendency. To allow
tolling might wipe out a statute of limitations in all cases of conspiracy,
since the conspiracy might remain undiscovered for a long period of time.
Those who oppose tolling the statute seem to be most concerned with
procedural problems in the use of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. Judge
Christensen of the District Court of Utah points out several questions that
would arise: "Assuming a conspiracy is established, would mere failure of
the participants to disclose the conspiracy as a whole, or limited facts with
reference to it, suspend the running of the statute?" "To what degree must
concealment appear, and in what form, to amount to 'fraudulent conceal-
ment'. [Sic] How will we instruct the jury; what standards for our deci-
sions?"22
 To Judge Christensen these are obstacles which are insurmountable.
Another objection is that one of the essential purposes of the antitrust
laws, diligence in bringing to light antitrust violations, could be better served
by requiring all actions to be brought within four years. This limited time
would compel private parties to be more cautious in their business dealings
and to be on constant guard against injurious conspiracies. To allow tolling
might put a premium on laxity.
While the legislative history could be used to argue against tolling the
statute of limitations in conspiracy cases, it could also infer that the statute
should be tolled in all conspiracies, as suggested by Congressman Celler.23
The latter situation presents difficulties for the court in Kansas City in
promulgating a general rule for the application of the fraudulent concealment
doctrine to conspiracy cases. The court does not go beyond the facts and
particular allegations of this case, where there is a clear showing of affirmative
acts of concealment by the electrical companies. Here the court is following
clear precedent,24 but the "self-secreting" conspiratorial compact would
evade the doctrine of fraudulent concealment as presented in Kansas City
because there could be no showing of affirmative conduct in concealing the
conspiracy. These conspiracies
. . . may be the ones in practice that prove most effective, predatory,
far reaching and damaging. . . . Will we then let suits for relief from
the more subtle and effective conspiracies be barred at the end of
four years and keep claims as to others alive for ten, twenty, or
thirty years or until the victims are demonstrably aware of the
conspiracy?"
Thus, there is the implication that a self-concealing conspiracy would not be
subject to the doctrine. Congressman Celler supported his explanation of
section 4B—that cases of fraud or conspiracy would toll the statute until the
cause of action was discovered—with past case law.2° These cases, however,
22
 Brigham City Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 574, 577, 578 (D. Utah
1962).
2a See text accompanying note 19, supra.
24
 Foster & Kleiser Co. v. Special Site Sign Co., 85 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 613 (1937).
25 Brigham City Corp. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 22, at 517-78.
26 Supra note 19, at 5130. "The basis of my conclusion in that regard is the cases
themselves. There are innumerable cases on that score."
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did not apply the fraudulent concealment doctrine unless there was evidence
of affirmative acts of concealment. The court in Kansas City strongly em-
phasizes the existence of such conduct in the presentation of the facts of the
case,27 in discussing the doctrine," and in its summary." Therefore, it is
questionable whether, absent the showing of affirmative acts of concealment,
the statute of limitations will be tolled."
It might be suggested that it is easy to avoid the whole problem by
laying down a flat rule that since Congress has shown no express intent to
the contrary, section 4B should be construed strictly, and all actions will be
barred if not brought within four years. This rule would not provide justice
in a situation such as the present case, where the largest companies in the
industry wilfully and blatantly flout the law and then seek to establish a,
construction of the statute which will allow them to avoid liability to the
private parties they have injured. Again, to apply the fraudulent concealment
doctrine in those situations where the antitrust laws may be vague or rapidly
changing would be a hard rule. As one letter to the 1951 committee hearings
stated:
Where learned judges can have such divergent views as to when
civil liabilities accrue for antitrust law violations, it is evident that
the businessman, even if he can afford the best legal advice avail-
able, must often continue to be uncertain as to whether he is on the
wrong side of the Iaw. 3 '
Thus, although the courts may be willing to infer a congressional intent to
have fraudulent concealment toll the statute of limitations in cases where
the doctrine would not operate harshly, they might not do so if the case did
not involve wilful conduct, or was less widespread in its effects, or involved a
conspiracy which was self-concealing by nature.
To offset the all-inclusiveness of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment,
the rules used by the Eighth Circuit seem reasonable. In the case of Foster
& Kleiser Co. v. Special Site Sign Co.,32 where the original cause of action
was a conspiracy to monopolize, the court stated that
. . . when fraud is not the gravamen of the action, in order to toll
27 Supra note 1, at 272.
28 Id. at 278.
29 Id. at 284.
30 That the fraudulent concealment doctrine would apply only in cases where the
injured party could allege and prove affirmative acts of concealment is forcefully put
forward by the court in City of Burlington, Vt. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra
note 6.
31 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, pt. 3, at 30 (1951). It
had been earlier stated, at 29:
From the standpoint of sound jurisprudence, no one can quarrel with the prin-
ciple of providing a uniform statute of limitations applicable to damage suits
under the antitrust laws. But the period should be short enough to provide some
protection against the institution of suits based on new or changed construction
and application of these laws. The history of antitrust law development suggests
that even within a 3-year period, wholly new concepts may be established as to
the legality of long-followed business practices.
32 Supra note 24.
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the applicable statute of limitations, two factors must be present:
(1) Fraudulent concealment; (2) nondiscovery, that is, absence of
facts that would put a party upon notice of the cause of action.
Mere ignorance of the injury complained of, or of the facts consti-
tuting such injury, will not prevent the running of the statute as
The plaintiff would be required to allege fraudulent concealment in the
pleadings and "must prove both affirmative acts of concealment on the part
of defendant and reasonable grounds for his own failure to penetrate the de-
ception."24 This basic procedure plus additional equitable rules on both
sides should result in a workable standard. In no event should a result be
reached whereby the wrongdoer is made secure from liability by fraudulently
concealing the cause of action. It is obvious that many companies seem to
think they have found a "loophole" in section 4B. This "loophole" has been
filled by the federal courts in previous cases, 35 and the present litigation does
not reveal any compelling reasons which prevent the application of the
fraudulent concealment doctrine to this supposed gap in the law. On the
other hand, there remains a possible gap in the law which, as previously
stated, appears not to be covered by Kansas City. In the self-concealing
conspiracy there may be no affirmative conduct by the wrongdoer, in which
case the exception to the running of the statute may not be applied. Whether
this gap will be closed is left to future case law.
EDWARD BOGRAD
Bankruptcy—Chapter XIII—Confirmation of Extension Plan within
Six Years of Previous Plan.—In re Holmes.'—In a Chapter XIII proceed-
ing the debtor sought confirmation of an extension plan which would give
him more time to repay his debts. The district court affirmed an order of
the Referee in Bankruptcy dismissing the debtor's petition on the ground
that section 14c(5) of Chapter 111 2 taken together with section 656a(3) of
Chapter X1113 operated as a bar to confirmation of an extension plan where
33 Id. at 752.
34 Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits Against Electrical Manufacturers: The
Statute of Limitations and Other Hurdles, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 29, 50 (1962).
35 Bailey v. Glover, supra note 10, and cases cited, supra note 9.
1 309 F.2d 748 (10th Cir, 1962).
2 Bankruptcy Act § 14c, 52 Stat, 850 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32c (1958)
provides:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has-
. . . (5) in a proceeding under this title commenced within six years prior
to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy . .. been granted a
discharge, or had a composition or an arrangement by way of composition
or a wage earners' plan by way of a composition confirmed under this
title . . . .
3 Bankruptcy Act § 656a, 52 Stat. 935 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1056a (1958) provides:
The Court shall confirm a plan if satisfied that-
. .. (4) the debtor has not been guilty of any of the acts or failed to per-
form any of the duties which would be a bar to the discharge of the bank-
rupt . . . .
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